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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 This disconcerting case, before our Court for the second 
time, has a lengthy procedural history marked by conflict 
between the Board of Immigrations Appeals (BIA) and the 
Immigration Judge (IJ) and fueled by troubling allegations that 
Petitioner, an Uzbek national, relished watching violent 
terroristic videos, while apparently harboring anti-American 
sympathies.  The issue on appeal, however, is whether the BIA 
correctly applied the clear error standard of review, as required, 
when reviewing the IJ’s factfinding in this case—an inquiry 
that highlights the role of faithful adherence to applicable 
standards of review in preserving the rule of law, safeguarding 
the impartiality of our adjudicatory processes, and ensuring 
that fairness and objectivity are not usurped by emotion, 
regardless of the nature of the allegations.  Because we 
conclude that the BIA misapplied the clear error standard when 
reversing the IJ’s finding that Petitioner’s testimony was 
credible, we will grant the petition for review of the BIA’s 
removal order, vacate the denial of Petitioner’s applications for 
adjustment of status, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and remand 
once more to the BIA. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 Petitioner Abduvakhob A. Alimbaev is a native and 
citizen of Uzbekistan.  According to his testimony before the 
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IJ,1 when he was a young teenager in the early-to-mid 1990’s, 
Alimbaev attended a handful of services led by Obidkhon Qori 
Nazarov, an imam who was accused by the Uzbek 
government—reputed for religious intolerance—of preaching 
violence and plotting a government takeover.  During that time 
period, Uzbek authorities rescinded Nazarov’s license to lead 
religious services, making it illegal for citizens to attend 
religious gatherings he hosted.  According to Alimbaev, on a 
day Uzbek authorities came to Nazarov’s apartment, Alimbaev 
was among a crowd of two- to three-hundred followers and 
reporters, all gathered to seek religious guidance and to prevent 
the government from surreptitiously arresting Nazarov.  
Alimbaev believes that when he was standing in the midst of 
the crowd, he was caught on video taken by authorities.  It is 
because of his connections to Nazarov in Uzbekistan in the 
1990’s and to others who were followers of Nazarov in the 
United States after he came to this country in 2001, as 
described below, that Alimbaev claims to fear persecution and 
torture if he is removed to Uzbekistan.   
 
Alimbaev testified that in February 2001, when he was 
nineteen, he traveled to the United States as a nonimmigrant 
visitor, planning to perform with an Uzbek band at a music 
festival in Los Angeles.  Although Alimbaev was with some of 
his fellow band members in the Tashkent airport, he did not see 
them on his flight to New York City or upon arriving at the 
airport.  Instead, according to Alimbaev, a girl from another 
                                              
1 This factual summary is derived principally from 
Alimbaev’s testimony.  See, e.g., Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y 
Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 211 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017); Jishiashvili v. Att’y 
Gen., 402 F.3d 386, 388 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Uzbek band informed him that his band members would not 
arrive until the following week.   Afraid he would not have 
enough money to survive on his own for that week, Alimbaev 
decided to travel to Orlando, Florida to visit a friend from 
Uzbekistan whose name and phone number his father had 
given him to use in case of emergency, rather than continuing 
as planned to Los Angeles. 
   
After a few months in Orlando and a brief stay in 
Dayton, Ohio, Alimbaev settled in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
There, Alimbaev testified, he shared an apartment with six or 
seven Uzbek Muslim men, all of whom were supporters and 
former students of Nazarov.  He also testified that not long after 
he moved into the apartment, Uzbek authorities came to 
Alimbaev’s parents’ house in Uzbekistan to inquire after 
Alimbaev’s whereabouts and to pressure his parents to 
facilitate his return, displaying pictures of him with his new 
roommates in Philadelphia and accusing him of being 
“involved with these bad guys.”  AR 1297.   
 
During this time, according to Alimbaev, he heeded 
warnings from his parents to stay in the United States by 
submitting applications to the then-called Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)2 to extend and change the status 
of his visa—applications that, it turned out, contained 
numerous misrepresentations.  Initially, with the help of a 
friend, Alimbaev filed for and received an extension on his 
tourist visa through January 2002.  That application falsely 
represented that Alimbaev was a computer scientist, that he 
                                              
2 In 2003, INS ceased to exist and its responsibilities were 
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 291. 
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had been invited to the United States by other computer 
scientists, and that his parents were wealthy and could support 
him for the duration of his stay.  Alimbaev testified that he was 
unaware of the false statements in the application when it was 
submitted, though he acknowledged that it did contain his 
signature.   
 
Later, when his visa was soon to expire in December 
2001, Alimbaev applied to have his nonimmigrant status 
changed from tourist to student, representing in that application 
that he had been admitted to the Concord English Language 
Center in California and attaching a false tuition invoice as 
proof.  Alimbaev testified that he was, once again, assisted by 
a friend in assembling this second application, but that he had 
no recollection of its contents or of actually submitting it to the 
INS.  Although the application was denied as untimely, he 
remained in the country without authorization, continuing to 
live in the same apartment in Philadelphia.   
 
In this communal residence, Alimbaev and his 
roommates occupied close quarters and shared just one 
computer, which, according to Alimbaev, he used only 
occasionally, typically to read international news.  In June 
2002, federal immigration agents executed a warrant at 
Alimbaev’s apartment, arresting, detaining, and placing into 
immigration proceedings Alimbaev and five of his roommates, 
four of whom were the subject of extradition requests and 
Interpol warrants issued based on outstanding charges of 
religious extremism in Uzbekistan.3  The agents searched the 
                                              
3 Our Court, in granting the petitions for relief later filed 
by Alimbaev’s roommates, held that these charges were 
baseless and “a pretext to single out and punish those in 
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roommates’ shared computer and discovered terroristic videos 
displaying Al Jazeera broadcasts—one of Osama bin Laden 
and one of Afghan fighters—images of Chechen rebel fighters, 
and scenes of destruction caused by explosives.  The computer 
also contained a map of Pennsylvania State Police barracks and 
an email to one of Alimbaev’s roommates praising an Islamic 
terrorist organization.  After two months, Alimbaev was 
released from detainment, and charged with removability, 
which he conceded.  Although removable, he soon became 
eligible to apply for adjustment of status based on two 
successive marital relationships.   
 
In 2003, Alimbaev married Shaketa Chapman, a United 
States citizen whom he divorced in 2005.  That December, he 
married his current wife, Kia Crawford, also a United States 
citizen, with whom, by the time of the hearing, he had had two 
children.   Alimbaev supports his family financially through 
the construction business he owns and operates, and Crawford 
takes care of their children full time.  Alimbaev also owns a 
house, and provides financial support to his mother-in-law.    
  
In 2008, based on his marriage to Crawford, Alimbaev 
applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident, a 
request the Attorney General may grant or deny in his or her 
discretion by balancing the positive and negative factors 
relevant to a petitioner’s application.  8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 
Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195 (BIA 1990); see 
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 111 (3d Cir. 2005).  At the 
subsequent hearing on Alimbaev’s application, held before an 
IJ in 2010, Alimbaev testified that he did not watch violent 
                                              
peaceful opposition to the authoritarian regime.”  Yusupov v. 
Att’y Gen., 650 F.3d 968, 982 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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terroristic videos on his former roommates’ shared computer, 
although he did view broadcasts downloaded from Al Jazeera, 
NBC News, and a Russian news channel that included 
coverage of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.  
Additionally, a government agent testified that none of the 
terroristic materials found on that computer were directly 
linked to Alimbaev’s email account or tied in any traceable 
way to his usage of the computer.  However, Alimbaev’s ex-
wife—who had by then changed her name to Shaketa 
Gonzalez—was called to testify as a rebuttal witness following 
Alimbaev’s testimony, and she asserted that during their 
marriage, while they lived together in an apartment with no 
roommates, she witnessed Alimbaev view and express 
enthusiasm for violent videos depicting terrorist acts on 
multiple occasions.   
 
Following the hearing, the IJ granted Alimbaev’s 
application to adjust status.  The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) appealed to the BIA, which vacated the IJ’s 
decision, concluding the adverse factors present in Alimbaev’s 
case outweighed the favorable equities.  The BIA remanded, 
however, to afford Alimbaev the opportunity to apply for 
asylum—a form of discretionary relief, see Guo v. Ashcroft, 
386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004)—and withholding of removal 
and CAT protection—both of which are mandatory if 
eligibility is established, see Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 
296, 300-01 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
On remand, in addition to seeking these forms of relief, 
Alimbaev submitted a new application for adjustment of status.  
The IJ held a second hearing in 2014, at which Alimbaev 
repudiated Gonzalez’s earlier testimony that he had watched 
violent videos of terrorist activity while they were married, 
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testifying that her statements were untrue and speculating that 
she was motivated by jealousy over his second marriage.  After 
the hearing, the IJ granted Alimbaev’s second application for 
adjustment of status, and, in the alternative, granted each 
additional form of relief he sought.  The IJ credited Alimbaev’s 
testimony both generally and specifically as to the violent 
videos, and found that in balancing the equities to adjudicate 
adjustment of status, Alimbaev, as well as his wife, children 
and mother-in-law (each of whom would remain in the United 
States),4 would face hardship if he were deported.   
 
At the outset of his second opinion, the IJ recounted in 
great detail Alimbaev’s testimony at the second hearing, which 
he found credible overall “based on the totality of the 
circumstances,” determining it to be “internally consistent, 
generally believable, and sufficiently detailed.”  AR 232.  
Specifically, the IJ highlighted as “candid” Alimbaev’s 
“testimony that Shakeyta Gonzalez said things about him that 
were not true” and his testimony that “he never watched Al 
Qaeda videos or videos advocating violence against the United 
States.”  AR 229.  On that basis, the IJ concluded that Gonzalez 
was “bias[ed],” that her testimony deserved little weight 
because it was uncorroborated by the DHS,5 and that overall, 
                                              
4 Crawford noted that she and the children would not 
accompany Alimbaev to Uzbekistan because of his anticipated 
imprisonment and her inability to speak the language or to 
obtain employment there. 
 
5 Although Gonzalez testified that she had made 
contemporaneous reports about Alimbaev’s interest in 
terroristic videos to her uncle who worked at the FBI and to 
others at the FBI, no written reports or other corroboration of 
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“the veracity and reliability of her testimony remain[ed] 
subject to doubt.”  AR 229.  The DHS appealed again, and the 
BIA, reviewing the IJ’s second decision, vacated that decision 
in its entirety, ordering Alimbaev’s removal from the United 
States to Uzbekistan. 
 
After Alimbaev petitioned our Court for review of that 
BIA decision and removal order, the Government promptly 
filed an unopposed motion to remand, seeking to allow the BIA 
to reconsider its decision in multiple respects, including the 
effect of the IJ’s credibility findings on Alimbaev’s 
applications for relief.  We granted the motion, returning 
Alimbaev’s case to the BIA for the third time. 
 
In 2016, the BIA vacated its prior decision and re-
adjudicated Alimbaev’s claims.  First, it reversed the IJ’s 
positive credibility determination regarding Alimbaev’s 
testimony as clearly erroneous and credited Gonzalez’s 
testimony regarding the violent videos.  In addition, the BIA 
held that Alimbaev’s application for asylum was time-barred,6 
and his applications for withholding of removal and CAT 
protection were meritless in light of Alimbaev’s incredible 
                                              
such conversations were offered by the Government at any 
point in these immigration proceedings. 
6 Alimbaev conceded at oral argument that, under 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), his application for asylum was 
untimely, and that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s 
discretionary determination that he is ineligible for the 
“changed circumstances” exception to that statutory bar, id. § 
1158(a)(2)(D); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4); Sukwanputra v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, we will not 
further address Alimbaev’s application for asylum. 
 11 
 
testimony.  The BIA also held that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to 
review Alimbaev’s second application for adjustment of status.  
In the alternative, it addressed the application’s merits, 
reversing the IJ’s finding that Alimbaev himself would suffer 
hardship upon being removed to Uzbekistan and declining, in 
its discretion, to adjust Alimbaev’s status to legal permanent 
resident.  Having denied all of Alimbaev’s claims, the BIA 
once again ordered his removal. 
 
Alimbaev now petitions this Court for review of the 
November 18, 2016 removal order of the BIA, asserting that 
the BIA erred in rejecting the IJ’s credibility determination.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude the BIA failed to 
properly apply the clear error standard of review when it 
overruled the IJ’s credibility finding, necessitating yet another 
remand for reconsideration of Alimbaev’s applications for 
adjustment of status, withholding of removal, and CAT 
protection.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
Although we have jurisdiction over removal orders of 
the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), see Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 
F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006), we lack jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s discretionary weighing of evidence, see Pieschacon-
Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2011), or the 
BIA’s denial of discretionary relief, including applications for 
adjustment of status, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), 1255; 
Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  
However, even when presented with these discretionary 
decisions, we may review “colorable claims or questions of 
law,” Pareja, 615 F.3d at 186 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), such as whether the 
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BIA “misapplied the legal standard,” Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 
F.3d at 310.  And, of course, when our jurisdiction is unclear, 
“[w]e have jurisdiction to determine whether we have 
jurisdiction.”  Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 188 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2007).   
 
As for what standard we apply, we review the BIA’s 
legal determinations de novo, including whether the BIA 
properly applied clear error review to the IJ’s findings of fact.  
Mendoza-Ordonez v. Att’y Gen., No. 16-3333, 2017 WL 
3611991, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug 23, 2017); Pieschacon-Villegas, 
671 F.3d at 310, 314; see Lin v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 122, 129 (2d 
Cir. 2016); Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 
2008).  Where, as here, the BIA issues its own opinion on the 
merits, we review that decision, not the IJ’s.7  Cadapan v. Att’y 
Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014). 
                                              
7 The Government takes no position regarding the 
BIA’s holding that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Alimbaev’s second application for adjustment of status, 
positing that we need not address this question because the 
BIA, in the alternative, considered and denied Petitioner’s 
second application on the merits.  However, because we must 
ensure that we review the correct BIA opinion, which turns on 
which adjustment application the IJ had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate, see Cadapan v. Att’y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2014), we pause to clarify the IJ’s jurisdiction.   
 
We have held that when the BIA does not expressly 
retain jurisdiction over a petitioner’s case and issues a remand 
order unlimited in scope and purpose, an IJ has jurisdiction to 
consider any matters pertinent to that case under the 
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III. Discussion 
 
 The central question in this case is whether the BIA 
misapplied the clearly erroneous standard in rejecting the IJ’s 
finding that Alimbaev’s testimony was credible.  We conclude 
that it did err and that this error necessitates remand to the BIA 
                                              
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing 
regulations.  Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (holding that unless remand from the BIA is 
“qualified or limited to a specific purpose,” an IJ may consider 
“any and all matters [he] . . . deem[s] appropriate in the 
exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought 
to his attention in compliance with the appropriate 
regulations”) (quoting Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600, 
601 (BIA 1978)).  Here, the BIA employed the following 
language in its first decision: “Because the respondent . . . 
indicated a desire to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and [CAT] protection . . . we [] remand the record to provide 
him the opportunity to apply for that relief or any other relief 
for which he may be eligible.”  AR 967.  Clearly, the BIA 
neither retained its own jurisdiction nor placed limits on the 
scope or purpose of its remand order, see Johnson, 286 F.3d at 
702-03, going so far as to spell out that Alimbaev was at liberty 
to apply for additional forms of relief beyond asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT protection.  Additionally, 
the INA does not confine the number of applications a 
petitioner may file.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255.  Thus, we have no 
difficulty concluding the IJ had jurisdiction over Alimbaev’s 
second adjustment application, and therefore we review the 
BIA’s analysis of that application as set forth in the BIA’s third 
and most recent opinion and order, which is the subject of this 
appeal.  See Cadapan, 749 F.3d at 159.   
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of Alimbaev’s applications for adjustment of status, 
withholding of removal, and CAT protection because the 
BIA’s analysis of the merits of each form of relief was affected 
by its reversal of the IJ’s credibility determination.  To explain 
how we arrive at this conclusion, we begin by situating the 
clearly erroneous standard in the context of credibility 
determinations; we then address how the BIA misapplied this 
standard by reversing the IJ’s credibility finding; and we close 
by explaining the implications of our holding in order to define 
with clarity the BIA’s task on remand.  We start with the 
clearly erroneous standard. 
 
A. The Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review of 
Credibility Determinations 
 
The Supreme Court explicated the concept of clear error 
review in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948), the seminal case for defining this standard, including 
in the immigration context.  See, e.g., Lin, 813 F.3d at 126; 
Kabba, 530 F.3d at 1245.  In Gypsum, the Court held that “[a] 
finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence 
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395.  Since Gypsum, the 
Court has acknowledged that “the meaning of the phrase 
‘clearly erroneous’ is not immediately apparent.”  Anderson v. 
City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).  Nevertheless, the 
Court has set forth certain defining principles, including that 
“[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous,” 
id. at 574, and that, where the disputed finding of fact is a 
credibility finding, “even greater deference” is owed, “for only 
the [factfinder] can be aware of the variations in demeanor and 
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tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s 
understanding of and belief in what is said,” id. at 575.  In 
short, “[t]his standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court 
to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is 
convinced that it would have decided the case differently.”  Id. 
at 573. 
 
These teachings apply with particular force when the 
BIA reviews an IJ’s credibility finding in immigration 
proceedings because a petitioner’s testimony, in many cases, is 
the singular evidence that establishes, or, conversely, disproves 
that petitioner’s case.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 
191 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he BIA may grant . . . [relief] solely on 
the basis of the applicant’s credible testimony.”).  The INA, by 
its terms, grants IJs broad discretion in making credibility 
determinations, providing that: “Considering the totality of the 
circumstances, and all relevant factors,” an IJ “may base a 
credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or 
responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent 
plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the 
consistency between . . . written and oral statements . . . , the 
internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of 
such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any 
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,” whether or not 
“an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 
the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”  8 U.S.C.   
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Although that subsection applies 
specifically to asylum applications, we have recognized 
previously that the wide latitude that it affords an IJ—in 
considering all pertinent factors and weighing those factors as 
the IJ deems appropriate in each individual case—carries over 
to other applications for relief.  See, e.g., Sukwanputra v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 636 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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In view of that broad latitude and factfinding authority, 
the BIA’s review of an IJ’s factfinding is highly deferential.  
See In Re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 464-65 (BIA 2002).  The 
BIA is prohibited from “engag[ing] in de novo review of 
findings of fact determined by an immigration judge,” and 
instead, “[f]acts determined by the immigration judge, 
including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be 
reviewed [by the BIA] only to determine whether the findings 
of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.”  8 C.F.R.           
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i).  The Board must “start from the premise that 
it will accept the findings of fact made by the immigration 
judge,” and it may only reject them if it “identifies specific 
reasons . . . for forming a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made.”  Board of Immigration Appeals: 
Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 54878-01, 54889 (Aug. 26, 2002).  Merely pointing to 
another permissible view of the evidence is insufficient.  In Re 
J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 263 (BIA 2007).  If further 
factfinding is needed, the Board must remand the proceeding 
to an immigration judge.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).  
Moreover, the BIA’s review of the record “must reflect a 
meaningful consideration of the record as a whole.  It is not 
enough for the BIA to select a few facts and state that, based 
on them, it disagrees with the IJ’s conclusion.”  Huang v. Att’y 
Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 387 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
When we, in turn, are called upon to review the BIA’s 
acceptance of an IJ’s factfinding, we carefully consider 
whether the BIA has adhered to its obligation to apply the clear 
error standard and whether it has applied that standard 
consistently.  When the BIA has adopted the IJ’s findings as 
being supported by substantial evidence, we will likewise 
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uphold those findings “to the extent that they are ‘supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.’”  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 
587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Mendoza-Ordonez, 2017 WL 
3611991, at *5.  And when our Court is called to evaluate an 
IJ’s credibility determination that has been adopted by the BIA, 
we do so with exceptional deference, recognizing that the IJ 
“alone is in a position to observe an alien’s tone and demeanor, 
to explore inconsistencies in testimony, and to apply workable 
and consistent standards in the evaluation of testimonial 
evidence.”  Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 597.  Stated differently, 
we view the IJ as being “uniquely qualified to decide whether 
an alien’s testimony has about it the ring of truth,” and our 
deferential review is built to reflect this principle.  Id. 
 
 Where the BIA rejects an IJ’s findings, however, we 
carefully scrutinize its reasoning to determine whether the BIA 
has overstepped these bounds and misapplied the clear error 
standard by “ignoring evidence relevant to determining” the 
merits of a petitioner’s claim, Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d 
at 310, failing “to supply cogent reasons for its rulings,” Lin, 
813 F.3d at 129, “substitut[ing] its own judgment for that of 
the IJ,” Kabba, 530 F.3d at 1247, or failing to “defer to the IJ’s 
findings,” id.  In those circumstances, we will grant a petition 
for review and remand for appropriate proceedings. 
 
Such is the case here.  Below, we identify each of the 
BIA’s missteps, explaining why its reversal of the IJ’s 
credibility finding reflects legal error.    
 
B. BIA Review of Alimbaev’s Testimony 
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In this case, the IJ found that Alimbaev’s testimony was 
“candid[],” AR 232, “internally consistent, generally 
believable and sufficiently detailed to provide [the IJ] with a 
‘plausible and coherent account.’”  AR 232 (quoting Matter of 
Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 1989)).  On the basis of 
that credible testimony, much of which was otherwise 
uncorroborated, the IJ concluded that Alimbaev was entitled to 
an adjustment of status, or in the alternative, withholding of 
removal or CAT protection.  The BIA, however, reversed that 
credibility finding, purporting to apply the clearly erroneous 
standard and finding clear error based on three aspects of 
Alimbaev’s testimony: (1) two inconsistencies; (2) the 
circumstances of his entry to the United States; and (3) 
Alimbaev’s alleged failure to rebut his ex-wife’s testimony that 
he watched terroristic videos.  We consider these three issues 
below. 
1. Inconsistencies 
 
We have observed that it would be improper for an IJ, 
much less the BIA, to discount entirely otherwise-credible 
testimony based solely on an “excessive focus on insignificant 
testimonial inconsistencies to support a finding of lack of 
credibility,” Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 
2005), and that the credibility of a witness must be considered 
in toto because the IJ’s “overall credibility determination does 
not necessarily rise or fall on each element of the witness’s 
testimony, but rather is more properly decided on the 
cumulative effect of the entirety of all such elements,” 
Jishiashvili v. Att’y Gen., 402 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 2005).  
“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous,” 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, and the BIA’s review of any 
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inconsistencies must be based on “meaningful consideration of 
the record as a whole,” Huang, 620 F.3d at 387. 
 
Here, however, the BIA homed in on two small 
inconsistencies in Alimbaev’s testimony.  First, the BIA 
deemed Alimbaev’s testimony to be “internally inconsistent” 
because, although he testified that his parents informed him in 
August 2001 that Uzbek authorities had come to their house 
and questioned them about his relationship with his roommates 
in Philadelphia, he testified at another point that he did not 
move to Philadelphia until October 2001.  AR 5.  When asked 
about the discrepancy in dates, Alimbaev testified that it was 
merely a mistake, reiterating that the conversation between 
Uzbek authorities and his parents did take place and that it took 
place after he moved to Philadelphia.  The IJ, in his second 
opinion, noted Alimbaev’s acknowledgment that he confused 
these dates but offered no additional analysis on this point.  
Second, the BIA took issue with the fact that, in the first 
hearing, Alimbaev testified that he attended Nazarov’s mosque 
two to three times, whereas in the second hearing, he testified 
that he attended the mosque six to eight times.  The IJ did not 
address this minor change in testimony, merely noting in his 
opinion that Alimbaev had previously attended the mosque, but 
was not a member.   
 
Although identified by the BIA as central reasons for its 
rejection of the IJ’s credibility finding, the two statements at 
issue appear to be no more than “insignificant testimonial 
inconsistencies,” Chen, 434 F.3d at 220, that would probably 
not, standing alone, justify an IJ in making a general adverse 
credibility finding, much less justify the BIA in rejecting a 
positive credibility finding under a clear error standard.  Thus, 
the BIA substituted its view for the IJ’s “permissible” view that 
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Alimbaev’s overall credibility was not thereby undermined.  
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.  While Alimbaev’s ability to recall 
specific numbers and dates may have been imperfect—and the 
number of times he attended Nazarov’s mosque does bear on 
his affiliation with Nazarov, with potential implications for 
Alimbaev’s likelihood of persecution and torture relevant to 
his claims for withholding of removal and CAT protection, see 
Kaita, 522 F.3d at 296, 300—the IJ could reasonably credit 
Alimbaev’s explanations and allow some leeway in his 
estimates of how many times he attended the mosque as a 
teenager nearly a decade earlier.  In holding otherwise, the BIA 
jettisoned “consideration of the record as a whole,” Huang, 620 
F.3d at 387, demonstrated “excessive focus on insignificant 
testimonial inconsistencies to support a finding of lack of 
credibility,” Chen, 434 F.3d at 220, and substituted its own 
view of the facts in place of the IJ’s “permissible” view, 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 
 
2. Circumstances of Alimbaev’s Entry to 
United States 
 
The BIA’s second ground for rejecting the IJ’s 
credibility finding was its determination that Alimbaev’s 
“testimony concerning the basis and circumstances of his entry 
into the United States” was “implausible” and his explanations 
“inherently improbable.”  AR 6.  The IJ did not expound on 
this issue, merely stating as a part of his review of Alimbaev’s 
application for adjustment of status: “As previously noted, the 
Court considers the circumstances surrounding Respondent’s 
admission and I-539 applications and the testimony of his ex-
wife disturbing and negative, but not sufficient to cumulatively 
outweigh the positive equities in his case.”  AR 228-29. 
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As noted by both the IJ and the BIA, Alimbaev’s 
explanation for his entry into the United States—that he lost 
his bandmates somewhere between the Tashkent airport and 
New York City and then abandoned his travel plans to Los 
Angeles in favor of visiting a friend in Orlando—appears 
implausible.  Likewise, Alimbaev’s false statements on his 
applications to extend and change his status are disturbing, 
notwithstanding his explanations that he relied on others to 
complete those applications.  But the question is not whether 
these circumstances were problematic negative factors; the IJ 
acknowledged that they were and counted them as “disturbing 
and negative” in reaching his conclusion.  AR 229.   
 
The question, instead, is whether the BIA, reviewing 
only for clear error, was entitled to set aside the IJ’s credibility 
findings and, hence, to disregard the testimony on which the IJ 
relied to conclude that Alimbaev feared persecution and torture 
if deported and that Alimbaev’s removal would result in 
hardship for his family.  See Jishiashvili, 402 F.3d at 396.  It 
was not.  As the IJ “alone is in a position to observe an alien’s 
tone and demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in testimony, 
and to apply workable and consistent standards in the 
evaluation of testimonial evidence,” Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 
597, and here the IJ did so after hearing extensive testimony 
over the course of two hearings, the IJ’s credibility finding was 
not “[im]plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” 
and therefore was not clearly erroneous, Anderson, 470 U.S. at 
574.8 
                                              
8 We are not suggesting that the spoken word will 
always trump other aspects of a record that may indicate a lack 
of credibility.  It is certainly possible that a record could 
appropriately leave the BIA with a definite and firm conviction 
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3. Rebuttal Testimony 
 
The third basis that the BIA identified for rejecting the 
IJ’s credibility determination was that because “the respondent 
did not specifically rebut [Gonzalez’s] testimony in either 
2010, or on remand in 2014, the [IJ] clearly erred in 
questioning the reliability of [Gonzalez’s] account of the 
events and assigning her testimony limited weight.”  AR 11.  
In addition, the BIA asserted that the IJ “did not make an 
adverse credibility finding with respect to [Gonzalez],” AR 10, 
and because the IJ did not make that finding—instead stating 
only that Gonzalez’s testimony “deserved limited weight” 
because it was “biased” and uncorroborated, AR 229, and that 
“the veracity and reliability of her testimony remains subject 
to doubt,” AR 229—the BIA could simply consider the 
contradictory testimony as one factor in its discretionary 
determination of adjustment of status—a determination this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).   
 
The BIA’s reasoning, however, rests entirely on a false 
premise.  Alimbaev did, in fact, rebut Gonzalez’s testimony 
that he watched “homemade” videos depicting violence against 
U.S. military members several times a week, AR 1469–70, by 
testifying in 2014 that he accessed websites to watch news 
videos but “never saw” videos depicting violence against U.S. 
forces, AR 335.  Moreover, the IJ, after carefully considering 
                                              
that an IJ has made a mistake about credibility, even in the face 
of the IJ’s finding that a petitioner’s testimony was truthful.  
Our point here is simple: on this record, the BIA overreached 
to sustain this particular result, and that was in derogation of 
its responsibility to apply the clearly erroneous standard in its 
review of the IJ’s findings. 
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the divergent accounts of the two witnesses, explicitly found 
that Alimbaev’s testimony refuting Gonzalez’s account was 
“candid,” AR 229, and his testimony was overall “credible,” 
AR 232.  By necessary implication, the IJ made an adverse 
credibility finding as to Gonzalez’s testimony, and the 
Government points to no authority suggesting either that an IJ 
must pronounce particular “magic words” in making its 
credibility findings or that an implicit credibility finding is 
entitled to any less deference than an explicit one.   
 
Also troubling, the BIA described the IJ as discounting 
“evidence from the respondent’s ex-wife establishing that the 
respondent regularly used a computer to watch videos of 
terrorist activity . . . as well as evidence that a computer was 
recovered at the residence containing such material.”  AR 10.  
Notwithstanding the BIA’s insinuation, however, the videos in 
question were not found on any computer in the marital 
residence and thus did not provide any corroboration for 
Gonzalez’s testimony.  Rather, the videos were found on the 
communal apartment computer that Alimbaev shared with his 
roommates prior to his marriage to Gonzalez—a computer that, 
as Alimbaev explained, he used only on occasion, and then 
only to watch the news.9   
                                              
9 This Court also had occasion to consider the nature of 
those videos in Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 650 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 
2011), where we pointed out that “none of the videos were 
‘training materials,’ . . .  several of the videos, including that of 
bin Laden, originated from Al Jazeera, a recognized news 
source,” and that on the whole, the computer “did not produce 
any direct or causal link suggesting that [they] espoused 
violence, such as email messages of a questionable nature.”  Id. 
at 985, 987. 
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In sum, the BIA’s characterization of the record appears 
inaccurate and reflects a decision to “ignor[e]” evidence 
crucial to Alimbaev’s case and contrary to the BIA’s preferred 
outcome, Kabba, 530 F.3d at 1247, effectively reweighing the 
testimony and engaging in the very “de novo review of 
findings of fact determined by an immigration judge” that is 
prohibited by regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).  Neither 
singly nor in combination are the three grounds identified by 
the BIA “sufficient justification for its conclusion that the IJ 
has committed clear error.”  Lin, 813 F.3d at 129.  For that 
reason, remand is appropriate for the BIA to reconsider 
Alimbaev’s applications for relief.   
C. Implications on Remand 
 
We turn, next, to the scope of remand and, specifically, 
to how reinstatement of the IJ’s credibility findings may affect 
Alimbaev’s claims for adjustment of status, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection.   
 
1. Adjustment of Status 
 
As we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s 
discretionary decision whether to grant Alimbaev’s adjustment 
application and the balancing of the positive and negative 
factors that underlie it, we only review the BIA’s application 
of the clear error standard to the IJ’s factual findings.  Based 
on that review, we will remand as to Alimbaev’s application 
for adjustment of status only for the BIA to accept the IJ’s 
credibility determination to which it should have deferred 
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when performing that balancing.  See Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 
188; Matter of Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 195.10   
                                              
10 Alimbaev also raises multiple arguments on appeal 
pertaining to the BIA’s adjustment of status analysis that we 
lack jurisdiction to review.  First, Alimbaev asserts that the 
BIA engaged in independent factfinding when it counted 
inaccuracies in his immigration applications against him in its 
balancing of the equities.  However, the IJ credited Alimbaev’s 
testimony that he was unaware of the misrepresentations in the 
submitted documents, describing the circumstances 
surrounding the applications as “disturbing and negative, but 
not sufficient to cumulatively outweigh the positive equities in 
this case,” AR 228-29, and the BIA “accept[ed] the [IJ’s] 
finding that the respondent lacked actual knowledge of the 
inaccuracies” in the applications, merely considering these 
inaccurate applications as a discretionary adverse factor.  AR 
12.  The BIA thus adopted and relied on the IJ’s factual 
findings and assigned greater significance to the inaccurate 
immigration applications when adjudicating Alimbaev’s 
application for adjustment of status than did the IJ.  The BIA 
was well within its rights to do so, and we do not review that 
discretionary decision.  See Pareja, 615 F.3d at 186.  In 
addition, Alimbaev suggests the agency was required to forego 
its exercise of discretion, disregard all negative equities, and 
grant Alimbaev’s application for adjustment because of his 
status as the immediate relative of a United States citizen.  
Petitioner’s Br. 33-34 (citing Matter of Battista, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
484 (BIA 1987); Matter of Cavazos, 17 I. & N. Dec. 215, 217 
(BIA 1980)).  Again, the BIA is entitled to assign the weight it 
sees fit to adjustment factors like a petitioner’s familial status, 
and its subsequent balancing of those factors is beyond the 
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Alimbaev’s credibility informs two factors that the BIA 
considered in its discretionary balancing.  First, it affected the 
BIA’s assessment of whether Alimbaev and his family would 
face hardship if Alimbaev returned to Uzbekistan.  The IJ had 
identified hardship as a positive factor because he found—
based solely on Alimbaev’s testimony—that Alimbaev’s 
removal would present hardship to his family because “it is 
likely that the Uzbek government will arrest and detain” 
Alimbaev, making him unable to work, and it would present 
hardship to Alimbaev himself “in light of the risk of arbitrary 
arrest, detention, and torture that he would face in his home 
country based upon his ardent practice of Islam, his association 
with Imam Nazarov, and his association with his former 
roommates.”  AR 230-31.  Because the BIA deemed 
Alimbaev’s testimony incredible, it perceived no factual 
support for the IJ’s determination of hardship and omitted 
hardship as a positive factor in its own adjustment of status 
balancing.   
 
Second, as discussed at length above, while the IJ did 
not consider Alimbaev’s alleged viewing of terroristic videos 
to be a negative factor because he credited Alimbaev’s 
testimony over that of Gonzalez, the BIA, as a result of its 
rejection of the IJ’s explicit credibility finding as to Alimbaev 
and implicit credibility finding as to Gonzalez, did consider it 
a negative factor. 
 
On remand, the BIA must reconsider those factors with 
due deference to the IJ’s factfinding before weighing the 
                                              
purview of our jurisdiction to consider.  See Pareja, 615 F.3d 
at 186.  
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various positive and negative factors to make its ultimate 
discretionary decision on adjustment of status.  
 
2. Withholding of Removal and CAT Protection 
 
The BIA’s error in its standard of review also affected 
Alimbaev’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT 
protection.  The IJ determined that Alimbaev made the 
required showing for withholding of removal—i.e.,  that it was 
“‘more likely than not’ that [Alimbaev’s] life or freedom 
would be threatened if returned to” Uzbekistan because of his 
religion or membership in a particular social group, Kaita, 522 
F.3d at 296—and for CAT protection—i.e., that it was more 
likely than not that he would be tortured in Uzbekistan “with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity,” id. at 300—through his 
testimony that he feared “being arrested, detained, and tortured 
in Uzbekistan based upon his appearance, his ties to . . . 
Nazarov, and his association with his former roommates,” AR 
232-33.  Additionally, the IJ determined that Alimbaev’s 
explanation for his failure to offer any corroboration from 
friends and family, while credible only in part and resulting in 
an “evidentiary gap”—was not so troubling as to overcome the 
strength of Alimbaev’s other testimony, AR 235, ruling that his 
testimony that he feared “being arrested, detained, and tortured 
in Uzbekistan based upon his appearance, his ties to . . . 
Nazarov, and his association with his former roommates,” was 
credible.  AR 232-33.   
 
But having discredited the only evidence supporting 
those rulings—Alimbaev’s testimony—the BIA necessarily 
reached a different outcome.  Accordingly, remand is required 
to allow the BIA, adopting the IJ’s credibility finding and 
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considering both Alimbaev’s testimony and the “evidentiary 
gap” the IJ acknowledged in the lack of corroboration,11 to 
reassess Alimbaev’s applications for withholding of removal 
and CAT protection. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Alimbaev’s 
petition for review of the BIA’s order of removal, vacate that 
order to the extent that it denied Alimbaev’s applications for 
adjustment of status, withholding of removal, and protection 
under CAT, and remand to the BIA for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
                                              
11 Although a petitioner’s testimony alone may be 
sufficient to sustain his burden of proof, we recognize that 
“failure to produce corroborating evidence may undermine a 
petitioner’s case where (1) the IJ identifies facts for which it is 
reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) 
the applicant fails to corroborate, and (3) the applicant fails to 
adequately explain that failure.”  Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192 
(citing Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
